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Abstract
The electoral success of the BJP in 2014 was hailed as the triumph 
of development over identity. The party seemingly reached beyond 
their traditional constituency and appealed to Dalit voters through 
an aspirational campaign. This tallies with arguments that electoral 
logic determines that the BJP will pursue a path of moderation. The 
past two years, however, have seen a significant increase in Dal-
it assertion and mobilization in opposition to the BJP. This paper 
takes these two trends to raise to inter-related questions: firstly, it 
questions the extent to which the BJP has moderated its attitudes 
toward Dalit citizens and secondly, it asks whether Dalit politics 
has indeed moved from identity to development. The paper draws 
on a range of secondary sources to argue that BJP moderation is 
delimited and that critiques of Dalit identity politics obscure both 
the identitarian strategies of other parties and the materiality of 
identity-based mobilization.
Keywords: Dalit Movements; BJP; Politics; Hindutva; Caste; Iden-
tity Politics; Development
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“Vayan a escribir en las paredes que ustedes son los que 
gobiernan esta nación”: La movilización Dalit y el BJP
Resumen
El éxito electoral del BJP en 2014 fue aclamado como el triunfo del 
desarrollo sobre la identidad. Aparentemente, el partido llegó más 
allá de su distrito electoral tradicional y atrajo a los votantes de Da-
lit a través de una campaña de aspiraciones. Esto coincide con los 
argumentos de que la lógica electoral determina que el BJP seguirá 
un camino de moderación. Los últimos dos años, sin embargo, han 
visto un aumento significativo en la afirmación y movilización de 
Dalit en oposición al BJP. documento toma estas dos tendencias 
para hacer preguntas interrelacionadas: primero cuestiona hasta 
qué punto el BJP ha moderado sus actitudes concernientes a los 
ciudadanos Dalit y segundo, pregunta si las políticas de Dalit han 
en realidad mutado de la identidad al desarrollo. El documento se 
basa en una serie de fuentes secundarias para argumentar que la 
moderación del BJP está delimitada y que las críticas a la política 
de identidad de Dalit ocultan las estrategias identitarias de otros 
partidos y la materialidad de la movilización basada en la identi-
dad.
Palabras clave: movimientos Dalit; BJP; política; Hindutva; Casta; 
políticas de identidad; desarrollo
在墙上写下“你是一国之主”这句话：
达利特人的动员和印度人民党
摘要
印度人民党在2014年大选中获胜一事被称为“发展战胜身份
认同”的胜利。该党似乎不仅获得了其传统的选民支持，还
通过激昂的竞选吸引了达利特选民。这与选民逻辑决定人民
党将采取温和做法的论点一致。然而过去两年间，达利特人
民声称并动员反对人民党的情况显著增加。本文就这两种趋
势提出了几个相互联系的问题：首先，本文提出疑问——人
民党在多大程度上缓和了其对达利特公民的态度？其次，达
利特政治是否真正从身份认同过渡到了发展？通过使用一系
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Introduction1
On April 2, 2018, Dalits across India took to the streets in, sometimes violent, protests 
triggered by a Supreme Court order 
that threatened to dilute the provisions 
of protective legislation. Loosely co-
ordinated around the call for a Bharat 
Bandh (India Blockade), Dalits blocked 
roads and railways, took to the streets, 
and placed their demands center-stage.2 
This widespread and passionate upris-
ing may be puzzling to some observers. 
After all, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s 
(BJP) success in the 2014 elections, es-
pecially in Uttar Pradesh, was hailed as 
signaling the end of identity or ethnic 
politics. Dalits were said to have reject-
ed the Dalit-led Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP) in favor of the promise of devel-
opment, epitomized in the figure of Na-
rendra Modi who rose from tea-seller 
to Prime Minister. As Irschick put it: 
“The BJP, which won only ten seats in 
[Uttar Pradesh in] 2009, got 71 out of 
83 seats in 2014, entirely demolishing 
the Dalit and Backward Classes base of 
the BSP. What we are suggesting is that 
... identity politics largely disappeared. 
Although ... Narendra Modi spoke in 
somewhat communal terms, his main 
goal was to articulate a strong devel-
opment program.”3 The increased ac-
ceptance of the BJP among Dalits was 
reinforced when three prominent Dalit 
leaders—Ramdas Athwale, Ram Vilas 
Paswan, and Udit Raj—joined the 
BJP-led National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA). If this suggests that the BJP 
has finally shed its characterization as 
an upper-caste party and reached out 
to Dalits, subsequent developments 
indicate that this process remains un-
certain and incomplete. Furthermore, 
we suggest that the framing of BJP as 
a political party of “development” and 
BSP as one of “identity” could be a hur-
ried conflation. Identity may indeed be 
latent in the development claims and 
promises of the BJP.
Mass Dalit mobilization in Uttar 
Pradesh and Gujarat suggests that the 
obituaries for Dalit assertion and pol-
itics were premature. This paper offers 
an analysis of Dalit politics under the 
BJP Government since 2014. It is im-
portant to emphasize from the outset 
that Dalits are not a homogenous cat-
egory as they encompass a variety of 
identities, politics, and demands. It is 
列二次文献，本文主张，人民党的缓和之策被划定了界限，
同时针对达利特身份认同的政治批判模糊了两个概念，一个
是其他党派的身份认同策略，另一个是基于身份认同的动员
实质性。
关键词：达利特运动，印度人民党，政治，印度教民族主
义，种姓制度，身份认同政治，发展
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increased Ambedkarization among the 
Scheduled Castes that could generate 
consciousness and lend coherence to 
the national Dalit category. However, 
Ambedkarization varies across regions 
and states, and such politicization of 
“untouchable castes” too is an ongoing 
process. It is, thus, important to note 
regional variations in India that inform 
various localized political repertoires 
even though this paper focuses on na-
tional-level developments. This paper 
sets out to address two inter-related 
questions. The first builds on Mitra’s4 
analysis of the BJP in office. He sug-
gests that the party has undergone a 
process of “ambivalent moderation,” 
reaching out to new constituencies and 
issues even as they retain commitment 
to the Hindutva project. In this paper, 
we explore the extent to which the BJP 
has moderated its stance toward Dalits. 
Secondly, we ask whether Dalit poli-
tics can be said to have undergone a 
shift from identity to development and 
more material, “mainstream” concerns. 
While it is impossible to capture this di-
versity in one short paper, we focus in 
on a number of key issues and debates 
that speak to the interplay between the 
BJP, caste, and Dalit mobilization since 
the 2014 elections. We begin, though, 
with a brief overview of how the BJP 
has been perceived and the process of 
transformation it has undertaken to 
reach out to a wider constituency.
The Mandalization of the BJP
The BJP was formed in 1980 out of the remnants of the Jana Sangh. It is an avowedly Hindu nation-
alist organization and “has no doubt 
about Hindu identity and culture being 
the mainstay of the Indian nation and 
of Indian society.”5 It is the most prom-
inent member of the “Sangh Parivar” 
and closely associated with the Rash-
tria Swyamsevak Sangh (RSS) (Nation-
al Volunteer Association). The Sangh 
Parivar (Family of Organizations) refers 
to the densely inter-networked groups 
of institutions committed to Hindu na-
tionalism. In the words of the ideolog-
ical inspiration behind Hindu nation-
alism, a Hindu is the one who “regards 
this land ... from the Indus to the Seas as 
his fatherland as well as his Holy land.”6 
Crucially for our purposes, this defini-
tion does two things. Firstly, it includes 
other religious groups that emerged on 
the Indian subcontinent: Jains, Sikhs, 
and Buddhists. Religious groups that 
arose, in part, as critiques of the Hindu 
caste order, thus, are encompassed in 
the broader pantheon of Hindu nation-
alism. Secondly, the definition glosses 
over and eludes the deep divisions of 
caste, language, and ethnicity.
Despite this attempt to create a 
united Hindu identity in opposition 
to religions that do not view India as 
their holyland, the BJP has long been 
regarded as a party of the Hindi-speak-
ing upper-castes. Jaffrelot argues that 
this stems from the close association 
between Hindutva ideology and a brah-
minical view of caste as harmonious 
and interdependent.7 The upper-caste 
character of the party was to the fore in 
1990, when the RSS mouthpiece—The 
Organiser—condemned the V.P. Singh 
Government for endorsing the Mandal 
Commission recommendations that 
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reservations of government jobs and 
university places should be extended 
to the “Other Backward Castes.”8 Jaffre-
lot notes how the RSS sought to dele-
gitimize reservations by campaigning 
against untouchability and providing 
welfare and tuition to Dalits. The aim 
here, he argues, was “to divert the Dal-
its, who are naturally appreciative of 
charitable work, away from egalitarian 
ideologies and to assimilate them into 
a ‘Hindu nation.’”9 In its early years, the 
BJP also sought to combat the issue of 
Mandal (extension of democratic rights 
and privileges to lower castes) with mo-
bilization around Mandir (attempts to 
replace a mosque in Ayodhya with a 
temple). This communal mobilization 
“tried to subsume all castes, including 
the Dalits, into one vast Hindu vote-
bank.”10 
As Basu notes, elections fought 
on an overtly communal platform “re-
vealed a lack of popular support for 
Hindutva.”11 In response to elector-
al setbacks, the BJP sought to affirm 
its “secular” credentials12 both in its 
manifesto and in alliances with politi-
cal parties of the lower castes. Jaffrelot 
refers to this latter process as “indirect 
mandalisation,” but in the late 1990s, 
he argues that the BJP adopted “a more 
direct brand of mandalisation, induct-
ing a growing number of lower-caste 
cadres in the party executive commit-
tees.”13 Opinion is largely divided over 
the autonomy of lower-caste BJP lead-
ers, the incorporation of these leaders 
is clearly a response to lower-caste as-
sertion and political engagement, and 
raises questions about the moderating 
effects of participation in electoral pol-
itics.14 While Basu notes how this pro-
cess prompted an intra-party backlash 
which resulted in the RSS increasing 
“its control over the party,” it is telling 
that these internal conflicts have not 
reversed the mandalization of the BJP.15 
While communal polarization has re-
mained central to BJP campaigns,16 it 
has gone alongside the incorporation 
and elevation of lower-caste figures in 
the party. Indeed, the mandalization 
of the BJP was seemingly completed in 
2014 when it won an electoral majority 
with a Backward Caste (but not low-
er) Prime Ministerial Candidate and a 
sizeable number of Dalit votes.17 As Ra-
maseshan observed, Modi’s caste back-
ground was placed front and center of 
the campaign to woo OBC votes.18 Does 
this mean that the BJP has succeeded 
in replacing “Hindutva with vikasvad 
(development)”?19 We will explore this 
later, but suffice to say that voting in 
elections is heavily influenced by lo-
cal concerns of identity, ideology and 
patronage, anti-incumbency, welfare 
promises, and the past experience of 
pledge-fulfillments. While the BJP may 
continue to emphasize development, 
latent in its appeal is the reassured con-
fidence of the upper castes in its ideo-
logical commitment toward nationalist 
Hinduism.
The BJP and Dalits
The main plank of the BJP’s 2014 election was the promise of “de-velopment” and in the first bud-
get of the NDA, there was an increase 
in expenditure dedicated to Scheduled 
Castes from the previous year. Outlay 
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dipped significantly in the following 
two years before recovering somewhat 
in 2017. Crucially, in none of the years 
did expenditure meet the minimum 
quantitative norm laid out in the Spe-
cial Component Plan (Krishnan, email 
communication).20 The performance of 
the BJP government is not much differ-
ent from that of other governments in 
this regard. Another concrete promise 
in the BJP manifesto was to fast-track 
the elimination of manual scaveng-
ing—the degrading practice of manual-
ly cleaning human excreta from sewers, 
toilets, and drains. There has also been 
a move to bring more Dalit leaders into 
the NDA if not the BJP. This is a signif-
icant move, since what marginalized 
groups often demand from political 
parties is greater representation.21
Kanshi Ram—the founder of the 
BSP famously described Dalit politi-
cians in established parties as “cham-
chas” or stooges. More recently, Uma 
Bharti, the firebrand OBC leader of the 
BJP, argued that “BJP OBC candidates 
have an upper-caste mentality.”22 Given 
this, and the party’s initial opposition 
to reservations, it is important to ask 
whether the changing face of the BJP is 
anything more than tokenism. In other 
words, does the party manifesto reflect 
a commitment to the lower castes, espe-
cially Dalits, or are they simply standing 
a more diverse array of candidates in 
order to seem more inclusive? Gaining 
more leaders from the lower castes has 
helped the party to shed its upper-caste 
image, but “till now, Dalits have not 
been given any crucial role under the 
BJP and RSS leadership.”23 The BJP may 
have gained more leaders from among 
OBCs and Dalits, but power continues 
to elude them after the formation of the 
government.
Despite emphasis on Modi’s 
OBC background, the upper 
castes again rule the roost in his 
cabinet, including Brahmins, 
Rajputs, Kayasthas, Vaishyas and 
dominant or “forward” commu-
nities like Lingayats, Vokkaligas 
and Marathas, who account for 
20 of the 46 ministerial berths. 
OBCs have 13 representatives, 
tribals six and dalits three. 
Among the 24 Cabinet members 
(including Modi), 12 are upper 
upper caste, five OBC, two dalit 
and one a tribal. With just three 
is the entire council, they (Dalits) 
have a mere 7% of berths, com-
pared to a share of about 15–16% 
in the country’s population.24
Similarly, the return of BJP to 
power in Uttar Pradesh assembly meant 
little for OBC and more particular-
ly Dalits. In UP, the number of upper 
caste MLAs grew to “44.3%, 12 percent-
age points more than in 2012, and the 
highest share in UP Assemblies since 
1980.”25 In other words, for all the cri-
tiques of identity-politics, the induction 
of Dalit leaders of the present into the 
NDA appears like an extension of such 
politics in which Dalit figures are afford-
ed recognition on the basis of who they 
are rather than what they stand for. This 
is further seen in the BJP’s increased 
recognition of “Dalit” heroes and icons. 
Narayan argues that the BJP’s success in 
2014 was the result of a long-term strat-
egy aimed at winning over Dalits.26 
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Narayan contends that the BJP 
adopted a dual strategy; on one hand 
“accommodating leaders” as mentioned 
above, and on the other, “appropriating 
cultural symbols and folk icons popu-
lar in Dalit oral traditions and ... imbu-
ing them with a saffron tinge.”27 Such 
strategies play on the desire by Dalits to 
gain recognition and acceptance. Cru-
cially, these local heroes are woven into 
communalized narratives that blame 
Muslims for the deprivations faced by 
Dalits and “reinterpret the Dalit past as 
a Hindu past.”28 The celebration and re-
interpretation of particular caste figures 
is closely linked to status concerns and 
fractures the fragile unity of Dalit poli-
tics.29 Simultaneously, however, the BJP’s 
symbolic recognition of Dalit assertion 
pivots on Ambedkar, who is clearly a 
unifying figure for Dalit groups. While 
he was a figure of hate for the RSS in the 
post-Independence period, both for his 
championing of the Hindu Code Bill 
and for his promise to convert out of 
Hinduism, the mouthpiece of the group, 
The Organiser signaled a change in tune 
in April 2016 when its front cover pro-
claimed Ambedkar to be the “great uni-
fier.”30 Modi has praised Ambedkar as a 
global figure on a par with Martin Lu-
ther King, and the BJP have invested in 
memorials to Ambedkar in Delhi, Lon-
don, and Mumbai.31 The Government 
also re-printed Ambedkar’s writings 
and speeches. 
Can we conclude from all of these 
that the BJP has undergone not only a 
process of Mandalization, but of Daliti-
zation too? The celebration of the first 
law minister of India and the man who 
oversaw the writing of the Constitution 
should not be seen through the prism 
of caste, but unfortunately Ambed-
kar has tended to be pigeonholed as a 
Dalit rather than national leader, and 
political parties have used his image to 
woo Dalit voters.32 It is also true that 
the BJP have not always been receptive 
to the idea of Ambedkar as a national 
icon. For example, BJP politician Arun 
Shourie’s critique—Worshipping False 
Gods—is perhaps the best-known po-
lemic against Ambedkar.33 The PM 
paying homage to Ambedkar and ac-
knowledging his contribution does not 
necessarily mean that Ambedkar has 
finally received full recognition. Rec-
ognition without new gains, as Gamson 
reminds us, constitutes co-option.34 Let 
us take a look at the BJP’s other actions, 
statements, and policies to assess where 
it stands. 
Such symbolic recognition is ac-
companied with occasional efforts from 
the RSS to “challenge” caste barriers, 
emphasizing sympathy across castes 
and more particularly toward Dalits.35 
While the RSS is close to the religious 
sentiments of caste Hindus, it is also at-
tempting to distinguish between caste 
sentiments and Hindu sentiments, con-
structing the latter as a nationalist sen-
timent. Increasingly, “Hindutva is only 
marginally interested in the forms of 
worship and almost not at all in meta-
physical concerns as the religious jus-
tification of the caste hierarchy; it is 
interested in the strength and unity of 
Hindus.”36 Of note, is therefore the new-
found and trenchant defense of reser-
vations by the Prime Minister—though 
RSS spokesmen have called for revision 
of reservation policy as recently as Jan-
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uary 2017.37 The perception is that the 
reservation policy is only fully accepted 
by the Mandalized sections of the party. 
What though of the commitment to end 
manual scavenging? Despite including 
this in the manifesto, “Modi’s vision”38 is 
devoid of any reference to social justice, 
and the death of seven manual scaven-
gers in seven days in the first two days 
of 2018 prompted no outcry from the 
Government.39 In 2009, Modi told such 
workers that: “A priest cleans a temple 
every day before prayers, you also clean 
the city like a temple. You and the tem-
ple priest work alike.”40 Although much 
has changed for Modi since 2014, the 
failure of the Gujarat model to address 
manual scavenging allied to such asser-
tions invites skepticism surrounding 
the Government’s commitment.41
The track record of the BJP in 
meeting development-related promises 
has also come under scrutiny. In 2018, 
Mohammad found that: “Government 
departments and central public sector 
undertakings (PSUs) have procured just 
0.37% of their requirement of goods 
and services from Scheduled caste (SC) 
and Scheduled tribe (ST) suppliers as at 
the end of March 2017, against the stip-
ulated annual quota of 4%.”42 The BJP 
model of “development,” thus, appears 
to be caste-blind. The dramatic imple-
mentation of demonetization illustrates 
this trend. Guerin et al. note how Dal-
its were disproportionately numbered 
among borrowers rather than lenders 
and experienced severe hardships as 
cash flows were interrupted.43 As they 
conclude: “Demonetisation of Novem-
ber 2016 was supposed to contribute to 
the formalisation of the Indian econo-
my, which in turn was expected to ben-
efit the poor. However, as no extra effort 
was put into formal social protection, 
the policy mostly caused a rise in the 
informal economy, especially—but not 
only—informal debt. Indeed, historical 
forms of inequality in Indian society 
have probably been reinforced.”
Finally, consider the following: 
The Ambedkar Foundation, which is 
the Government of India body respon-
sible for publishing Ambedkar’s writ-
ings and speeches in Hindi produced a 
“Collected Works” edition that omitted 
several key works including Annihila-
tion of Caste and Riddles in Hinduism.44 
The suggestion is that Ambedkar is 
being appropriated and rendered ac-
ceptable for a Hindu audience. This 
raises question marks over the extent 
to which electoral participation has di-
luted the BJP agenda and, as Ganguly 
notes, “indicates that the BJP has hardly 
abandoned its agenda of cultural na-
tionalism.”45 BJP–Dalit relations, thus, 
continue to be uncertain, riddled with 
contradictions, and subject to changes 
of direction. In what follows, we unpack 
some of these contradictions by refer-
ence to a number of controversies and 
policy debates that have arisen during 
the tenure of the current Government.
Dalits and the Beef Ban
The sacral purity of cows and the extreme impurity of the un-touchables as beef eaters, con-
tinue to co-constitute the hierarchi-
cal whole of caste in the imaginaries 
of caste Hindus, particularly in north 
India. While the BJP increasingly em-
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phasizes the scientific aspects of cow 
protection, the popular caste Hindu 
sentiment on cows and their sacrality 
are largely religious. Does this point to 
a disjunction between the popular caste 
sentiment on the sacrality of cow and 
the way BJP understands it? As Basu 
notes, the imposition of bans (some-
times partial) on cow slaughter and the 
sale of beef has been central to the BJP 
policy in states where it has assumed 
power since the early 1990s.46 This is, 
Basu argues, one of the issues on which 
the BJP has “collaborated closely with 
the RSS and the VHP in pursuing Hin-
du nationalist goals.”47 Such bans have 
denied Dalits and Muslims access to af-
fordable meat and income from leath-
er-related work and have also resulted 
in violence against those suspected of 
killing cows. Given the prominence of 
this issue for BJP state governments, 
it should come as no surprise that the 
NDA sought to implement these poli-
cies more widely. In the section of the 
BJP 2014 Election manifesto devoted 
to “cultural heritage,” the party prom-
ised that: 
In view of the contribution of cow 
and its progeny to agriculture, 
socio-economic and cultural life 
of our country, the Department 
of Animal Husbandry will be 
suitably strengthened and em-
powered for the protection 
and promotion of cow and its 
progeny.48 
While the BJP increasingly em-
phasizes scientific reasons, compassion, 
and constitutional modes for cow pro-
tection, encapsulated here is the BJP’s 
exclusion of Muslim citizens and its 
ambivalent relationship toward Dal-
its. The communalization of politics 
has long been viewed as a means of se-
curing Dalit support.49 Dalits are not 
wooed unconditionally, however, but 
are to be welcomed into the party on 
condition that they abandon beef-eat-
ing and leather work. Such concerns 
are, of course, deeply political as seen in 
the contrasting BJP electoral campaigns 
in Uttar Pradesh—where Amit Shah 
declared that all slaughterhouses would 
be shut—and the North-East—where 
voters were informed that no beef 
bans would be imposed.50 If this vari-
ation demonstrates the BJP’s attempts 
to grow beyond its heartlands, the re-
peated emphasis on cow protection 
testifies to it regional powerbase. Na-
trajan and Jacob highlight substantial 
regional differences in meat (including 
beef) eating, which map onto the tra-
ditional strongholds of the party.51 They 
note how caste and income help explain 
incidence of vegetarianism.52 Arun,53 
Waghmore,54 and Natrajan55 observe 
that not only is beef a cheap source of 
protein, it has become a key part of the 
identity of assertive Dalit groups. It is 
partly for this reason that Dalit leaders 
have periodically insisted that they are 
“not Hindu.”56 
Cow protection as a strategy for 
unifying Hindus, therefore, is deeply 
flawed. In January 2018, the overly po-
liticized conflation between beef-eating 
and communalism was made trans-
parent in Telangana when a vigilante 
mob disrupted a Dalit feast reportedly 
asking: “Are you Muslims to eat cow 
meat?”57 If the BJP views cow protec-
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tion as part of a communal agenda, the 
discourse around the mother cow has 
stirred up passions that have been hard 
to contain and have adversely affected 
Dalits as well as Muslims. In July 2016, 
thus, in the village of Una in Gujarat, 
four Dalit men who were skinning the 
carcass of a dead cow were set upon by 
self-proclaimed gau-rakshaks (cow pro-
tectors) who publicly thrashed the men 
and circulated videos online.58 One 
of the more prominent immediate re-
sponses came from a BJP legislator who 
opined that the Dalits had been “taught 
an appropriate lesson.”59 Desai and Roy 
note how the BJP in Gujarat sought to 
shift the divisions over caste to religion 
by uniting “upper-castes, Dalits and Ad-
ivasis against Muslims.”60 Una fractured 
that alliance, as Giri argues, and led to 
a “militant refusal by Dalits to carry out 
the so-called traditional occupation 
of skinning and lifting dead animals.61 
This meant the focus of the Una upris-
ing was not really on the ‘material basis 
of caste’ or on demanding land, but on 
exposing the casteist basis of society as 
a whole.” While BJP and RSS may em-
phasize sympathy and consideration 
toward marginal castes, ideas such as 
those of cow protection construct prac-
tical challenges for the project of Hin-
du consolidation. Furthermore, BJP’s 
coming to power also leads to increased 
violence against Dalits as the anti-Dal-
it sentiments seem to find ideological 
backing from state.
Dalit assertion has not been con-
fined to Gujarat or cow sacrality there-
fore. In Uttar Pradesh, the trigger was 
not cow protection, but had a similar 
genesis in the over-bearing actions of 
Other Backward Castes emboldened 
and given license by the election of a 
party, they saw as their own. In Uttar 
Pradesh, disputes over a sign-board 
unashamedly celebrating Chamars and 
a procession around Ambedkar’s birth-
day brought a local movement, focused 
on fighting atrocities and providing tu-
ition, to prominence. Chandrasekhar, 
the leader of the Bhim Army (Bhim by 
reference to Bhimrao Ambedkar), ex-
plicitly flagged up his disillusionment 
with BJP strategies, and the partial 
nature of BJP moderation, in noting: 
“Whenever there was a Muslim–Dal-
it clash, the ABVP [Akhil Bharatiya 
Vidyarthi Parishad—All India Student 
Council, the BJP student wing] was 
always there. But when it came to vio-
lence by upper-caste Hindus, the ABVP 
was nowhere to be seen.”62 While root-
ed in local concerns, the activists were 
tied into broader networks and debates 
and cited concerns over the atrocities 
in Gujarat and elsewhere, testifying 
to the growth and spread of a virtual 
Dalit counter-public or network.63 In 
their study of voters in Gujarat, Desai 
and Roy found “no clear evidence of a 
resistant subaltern consciousness” and 
noted how Dalits remained ambiva-
lent toward the BJP—cautiously buy-
ing into narratives around security and 
development despite anger over per-
sistent discrimination.64 Rather than 
Dalit politicians, we would argue that 
the actions of caste-Hindus in Una and 
elsewhere, and the tacit condoning of 
caste violence by those in power, have 
fractured the prevailing narrative by 
placing caste concerns front and center 
of Dalit politics.
“Go Write on the Walls That You Are the Rulers of This Nation”: Dalit Mobilization and the BJP
41
Contested Pasts, 
Contentious Presents
The ever-present tensions be-tween the different constituen-cies that the BJP seeks to weave 
together as “Hindu” were further deep-
ened and foregrounded in January 
2018 during Dalit commemorations 
at Bhima Koregaon. The events cap-
ture how the politics of the BJP have 
changed caste dynamics and relations 
in key ways. As Kumbhojkar notes, the 
obelisk standing at Koregaon is an odd 
artifact to create a furore.65 Erected in 
the 1800s, it marks the site of a fierce 
battle between high-caste Peshwa forc-
es and an outnumbered British East 
India Company battalion. Significantly, 
the British forces included a number of 
Mahars in its ranks. The memorial has, 
thus, become central to the Dalit calen-
dar. Indeed, 
among the neo-Buddhists in 
western India, the pilgrimage to 
the Koregaon memorial emerged 
as one of the invented cultural 
practices and thousands of them 
throng to the memorial every 
New Year day to commemorate 
the valour of the Mahars who 
helped to overthrow the unjust 
high-caste rule of the Peshwa. 
They also commemorate Am- 
bedkar’s visit to the place on 1 
January 1927.66
While the disruption to traffic 
caused by the celebrations was seen 
as an annoyance, Kumbhojkar’s piece, 
written in 2012 describes an out-of-the-
way invented tradition67 celebrating the 
valor and bravery of Mahars. There is 
no indication, in that paper, of the con-
troversy that it sparked in 2018 when 
those paying homage at the site were 
attacked by members of right-wing 
Hindu groups supported by local dom-
inant castes. The violence unleashed in 
the village generated a wave of protests 
that brought Mumbai to a standstill.68 
Two key differences marked the event 
in 2018. Firstly, the numbers attending 
the memorial were exponentially larger 
than usual as this year marked the bi-
centenary of the battle and numerous 
organizations sought to mark the occa-
sion in style. The second key difference, 
as Ingole sardonically notes, is that “91 
years after Babasaheb Ambedkar de-
clared it a symbol of Mahar valour and 
73 years after independence from the 
British, Hindu nationalists have real-
ised that the obelisk is in fact a symbol 
of British conquest. And that, celebrat-
ing ‘anything’ to do with it is an anti-na-
tional act.”69
That said, the attacks must be 
contextualized against a discourse of 
caste-Kshatriyahood, and its mascu-
line undertone. Such discourses are 
not only inward-looking, they are key 
to the hierarchical nature of caste. The 
supposedly warrior castes such as the 
Rajputs claim valorous pasts to aggres-
sively engineer caste. In Maharash-
tra, vehicles of the Marathas regularly 
carry the symbol of Raje (king), often 
written in saffron with a sword, to go 
with pejorative commands like Bagtos 
Kai Mujara Kar (Salute! What are you 
looking at), and slogans like Jai Shiva-
ji Jai Bhavani.70 The Dalits’ claim of the 
victory against the Peshwas in Bhima 
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Koregaon challenges this caste-based 
and myth-infused discourse of warrior-
hood. That this claim was not entirely 
based on myth complicates the contem-
porary telling of a linear Hindu history 
of patriotism and nationalism. For here, 
the martial past is invoked not as fight-
ing in service of others or as a matter 
of caste pride, but as an anti-caste war 
that became possible only during co-
lonial rule and generated newer possi-
bilities of citizenship and nationhood. 
Such a narrative undermines the ideas 
of Hindu-Kshatriyahood and Hindu 
nationalism, meaning that an attack on 
the Dalit-celebration may have been 
impending. 
If the beef-ban began to prob-
lematize the category of “Hindus” that 
are the subject of Hindutva politics, 
the repeated tendency of BJP affili-
ates to “speak for the nation” further 
fragments the constituency that they 
claim to represent. While Dalit groups 
marked and celebrated the courage and 
valor of Mahar soldiers in the battle, 
members of Hindu-right groups mo-
bilized to attack the event.71 Some sym-
pathetic commentators have critiqued 
the Dalit focus on a “mythical past” 
in that no Dalit consciousness existed 
at that time,72 but the violence against 
the event generated an upsurge that has 
contested the charge of anti-national-
ism and “exposed the hypocrisy of the 
homogeneous Hindu narrative.”73 In 
doing so, Dalit movements have chal-
lenged dominant historical accounts 
from which they are excluded, and 
highlighted the superficial nature of 
their political inclusion. Indeed, follow-
ing the protests that affected all of Ma-
harashtra, several young Dalit workers 
and protestors were arrested by the po-
lice across Maharashtra. It is the actions 
of authorities here, and elsewhere, in 
other words, that have served to polit-
icize Dalit identity. Dalits embracing a 
Hinduized past have been embraced, as 
seen above, but those seeking to reclaim 
a history of agency and activism of their 
own have been cast as seditious subjects 
to be controlled and subdued.
Silencing Students and 
Campus Revolts
Sedition charges also feature prom-inently in sustained campaigns against student activism and pol-
itics which have generated contentious 
debates around freedom of speech and 
“anti-nationalism.” Since the BJP as-
sumed office, its emboldened student 
wing, the ABVP has taken issue with, 
and sought to contest, student dissent. 
In 2015, the Ambedkar–Periyar Study 
Circle at IIT Madras was banned by 
the administration following interven-
tion from the Ministry of Human Re-
sources. The Ministry was acting on an 
anonymous letter accusing the group 
of polarizing students and creating ha-
tred against Narendra Modi, and the 
University hierarchy implemented the 
ban without discussing the matter with 
the students in question.74 A number 
of study circles sprang up around the 
country in solidarity and protest and 
the ban was eventually revoked, but a 
template of Government intervention 
and University compliance was estab-
lished.
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A similar pattern was witnessed 
in the University of Hyderabad, where 
ABVP students took issue with the 
Ambedkar Student Association’s de-
cision to screen a documentary on 
communal violence. Following alter-
cations and vitriolic online exchanges, 
an ABVP student was forced to apol-
ogize, but BJP Ministers intervened at 
this point accusing the Ambedkar As-
sociation of being “casteist, extremist 
and anti-national.”75 Responding to this 
pressure, Hyderabad Vice-Chancellor 
Appa Rao suspended five student lead-
ers of the ASA without due process and 
in flagrant breach of an earlier ruling 
that had cleared them.76 Locked out of 
their rooms, denied the dream of an 
education and faced by the prospect of 
disciplinary action, one of the five lead-
ers committed suicide. As an Open Let-
ter by academics across the globe put it:
Unable to bear the despair of 
having his one chance at a future 
snatched from him, of his value 
being reduced, in his own elo-
quent parting words, to nothing 
but “a vote” and “an immediate 
identity,” he took his own life. As 
scholars we know that individual 
actions are never just that. This 
suicide is not an individual act. 
It is the failure of higher educa-
tional institutions in democratic 
India to meet their most basic 
obligation: to foster the intel-
lectual and personal growth of 
India’s most vulnerable young 
people.77
Similar attacks on student activ-
ists and labeling of groups as anti-na-
tional have disrupted India’s premiere 
Universities. Student leaders from 
Jawaharlal Nehru University have been 
arrested and harassed for articulating 
dissent. In line with the above, passions 
have been inflamed by political inter-
ference. Meenakshi Lekhi, the BJP MP 
from Delhi, for example, demanded 
that JNU students should take an oath 
to “protect the country’s pride and na-
tionality.”78 Against this jaundiced view 
of external agitators, Martelli and Park-
ar conclude strongly, “JNU’s critical 
discourse (radical or not) is firmly com-
patible with a liberal and secular India 
which should revel in the diverse voices 
on university campuses.”79 In a strongly 
worded editorial in March 2018, Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly condemned 
the attack on public universities and in-
sisted that “if questioning government 
action is ‘anti-nationalism,’ universities 
must wear this as a badge of honour.”80 
The point being made here is that such 
institutions should be sites of critique 
and inquiry. While Mitra argued that 
the BJP had “not unleashed a full-scale 
cultural war in sensitive areas ... like 
education,”81 there has since been a ten-
dency to appoint supporters into senior 
University positions.82 
The upshot of such partisan in-
terventions was that Rohith Vemula 
was not only driven to take his own life 
but was not afforded dignity in death ei-
ther. Rohith, who poignantly observed 
that his birth into a low caste “was a fa-
tal accident,”83 was denied recognition 
even in death when the one-member 
judicial commission set up by Union 
Minister of Human Resource Devel-
opment Smriti Irani, disregarded exist-
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ing evidence to rule that he was “not a 
Dalit.”84 Rohith was born to parents of 
different castes and yet, having been 
brought up by his Dalit mother in a 
Dalit colony, there was no controversy 
about his status until it was stirred up 
by BJP politicians.85 The result of this 
muddying of the waters, however, was 
to enable police to ignore the cases filed 
against University authorities under the 
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe 
Prevention of Atrocities Act.86 It is to 
debates and controversies around this 
Act that we now turn.
Bharat Bandh: Defending 
Dalit Safeguards
In March 2018, a Supreme Court or-der condemned “misuse” of the Pre-vention of Atrocities Act for pur-
poses of blackmail and sought to amend 
the provisions of the legislation. The or-
der insisted that public servants should 
only be arrested under the Act with the 
approval of the appointing authority 
and that other arrests must be approved 
by a senior superintendent of police.87 
The Court produced no evidence to 
support its assertions about misuse, 
neglected numerous studies highlight-
ing the problems Dalits have in getting 
cases registered and the shockingly low 
conviction rates, and proposed to vest 
discretionary power in the hands of 
senior bureaucrats and police officers 
who are, thereby, elevated into the posi-
tion of judges. That such discretionary 
power might be abused and would of-
ten lie in the hands of those benefitting 
from caste privilege did not appear to 
trouble the justices.
Infuriated by this effort to dilute 
the Act, Dalit Government Ministers 
demanded a judicial review of the or-
der88 and Dalit groups across the coun-
try mobilized in protest for a Bharat 
Bandh (India Blockade) that witnessed 
marches, rallies, road and rail block-
ades across much of the country.89 
While the BJP Government responded 
to the protests by announcing that it 
would review the decision, Dalit politi-
cians and groups saw the Government 
as at least enabling such judgments to 
arise. Indeed, BJP ally, Suheldev Bhara-
tiya Samaj Party chief Om Prakash Ra-
jbhar supported the ruling, “arguing 
that ‘innocent people’ were harassed.”90 
Kulkarni, the former aide to Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee but no longer in a political 
post, felt better able to articulate sup-
port for the court order observing that: 
“The merit of the ruling is self-evident 
to all unprejudiced and justice-loving 
observers.”91 He testifies to the wisdom 
of the proposed amendment by observ-
ing that Maratha rallies have demanded 
that the Act be scrapped, that 75% of 
cases result in acquittals or withdraw-
als and that “I have personally known 
several cases of the misuse of the Act.”92 
He notes that in the cases of misuse that 
he encountered the accused were finally 
acquitted by the courts, but fails to note 
that the Act calls for fast-track courts, 
that Dalits struggle to get cases proper-
ly registered and often face counter-cas-
es, and that the proposed amendments 
allow individuals to rule on arrests. 
Kulkarni bemoans the BJP’s embrace 
of expediency (Dalit votes) over princi-
ples in this case, adding weight to Dalit 
concerns and highlighting limits to the 
BJP’s process of political moderation.
“Go Write on the Walls That You Are the Rulers of This Nation”: Dalit Mobilization and the BJP
45
In this light, the Bharat Bandh 
was most visible and saw most violent 
incidents in the BJP- controlled states. 
There were deaths of Dalit protestors, 
not surprisingly in Madhya Pradesh 
caste-Hindu civilians too fired at Dal-
it protestors along with police.93 In-
terviews with participants highlight-
ed that the anger on show reflected a 
host of different issues from explicit 
prejudice in the classroom to refusals 
to countenance Dalits as equals.94 Just 
days before the Bandh, a groom to-
be in Uttar Pradesh approached the 
High Court to secure permission to 
ride a horse in a marriage procession 
through the town. Local police and 
Magistrates had repeatedly refused to 
endorse such action and suggested that 
he take routes that by-passed locally 
dominant Thakur homes. Facing Thak-
ur anger and having had water supplies 
to their homes cut off, other Dalit vil-
lagers called for compromise noting 
that: “The Thakurs will not only pun-
ish them, they will punish us all. For 
them, we all are one.”95 The prevalence 
of collective punishments against Dal-
its, perceived to be growing too big for 
their boots, makes a mockery of claims 
of “reverse-casteism” and reminds us 
that caste also rests on control of re-
sources.96 Without an appreciation of 
the material and the cultural, it is easy 
to dismiss the “empty symbolism” of 
Dalit identity politics, neglecting the 
fact that there is, as Rao puts it, “no 
easy distinction between the symbolic 
and the real in Dalit politics.”97
 
Conclusion
As the reverberations from the Bharath Bandh continue to be felt around the nation, it is 
abundantly clear that a Government 
which assumed office on the promise of 
development has overseen an unprece-
dented wave of Dalit activism. Plastered 
to the wall in Bhim Army leader Chan-
drasekhar’s house is a slogan attributed 
to Ambedkar that reads: “Go write on 
the walls that you are the rulers of this 
nation.”98 Tempting though it may be 
to read nationwide protests or the re-
sounding victory of Jignesh Mevani in 
Gujarat as proof that the writing is on 
the wall, it is important to place such 
mobilization in context. If the asser-
tive mobilization of the past few years 
has showcased Dalit assertion and re-
fusal to accept indignities or political 
neglect, it has also revealed the con-
tinuing salience of caste prejudice99 and 
power.100 The BJP accommodation of 
Dalits in this light is akin to the “Hin-
du politeness” that Waghmore views as 
a hallmark of caste expression in con-
temporary India.101 The party embraces 
Dalits in rhetoric and theory,102 while 
maintaining a studious silence in the 
face of caste violence, and offering a 
critique of the violent “identity politics” 
of those articulating dissent. While the 
moderation of the BJP, in Mitra’s terms, 
remains decidedly ambivalent toward 
Dalits, increased violence against Dal-
its points to the popular upsurge of 
incivility backed by the “democratic” 
state.103 The “fear” among the margins 
more particularly Dalits of losing con-
stitutional safeguards and increasing vi-
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olence has even resulted in Dalit leaders 
aligned with the BJP speaking against 
their party (Athawale, for example, 
spoke against the beef ban and arrests 
following Bhima Koregaon). 
What though of the second 
question posed in the paper? Has Dalit 
politics moved beyond identity? Some 
astute commentators have discerned a 
sea-change in Dalit politics. Writing on 
the Gujarat elections in 2017, for ex-
ample, Nigam argues: Mevani’s “inter-
est in the land question has been quite 
unique insofar as contemporary Dalit 
politics is concerned, for it is based on 
the recognition that while questions of 
identity and self-respect are important 
they cannot be ensured while remain-
ing in the prison-house of what has 
come to be called ‘identity’ politics.”104 
While not wishing to diminish the sig-
nificance of Jignesh Mevani in Gujarat, 
we fear that some commentators have 
been swayed by their antipathy toward 
the BJP in their celebration of new di-
rections in Dalit politics. It is import-
ant to note that numerous Dalit move-
ments in the recent past have similarly 
raised demands for land and sought to 
create broad alliances.105 That such for-
mulations are hailed as a “new politics” 
should give us pause for thought. The 
differences in Mevani’s politics, we 
contend, lie more in terms of context, 
location, and coverage rather than con-
tent or form. More analysis, we argue, 
should be afforded to why Dalit leaders 
are still raising calls for land, livelihood, 
dignity, and freedom from violence in 
2018. Such an analysis requires us to 
cast a light on the hidden privileges of 
caste and operations of mainstream 
politics. The scorn reserved for Dalit 
“identity politics” obscures the fact that 
social policy and mainstream parties 
have neglected and obscured the struc-
turing effects of caste on the economy 
and on people’s life chances.106
It also glosses over the identi-
tarian strategies of parties in power. 
With reference to the BJP, for example, 
Vajpeyi notes how “introducing ‘Yoga 
Day’ and ‘Guru Day’ to the official na-
tional calendar, funding three new San-
skrit universities, and implementing 
Sanskrit language teaching at the IITs 
should all be seen as parts of BJP’s strat-
egy to normalize majoritarian religious 
culture in civil and secular institu-
tions.”107 Set against this, the notion that 
statues of Dalit leaders, protests around 
the Atrocities Act, or the defense of 
reservations “perpetuate caste” merely 
reinforces what Mosse terms the “invis-
ibilisation of caste privilege.”108 The BJP 
rhetoric of development has proved to 
be hollow for Dalits, but the interplay 
between the party in government and 
Dalits across the country has made two 
issues quite clear: firstly, that the so-
cio-political moderation of the BJP has 
limits, and secondly, that Dalit “iden-
tity politics” is as much, if not more, a 
response to socio-economic issues and 
caste symbolism practiced by others as 
it is a failure of political imagination. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it would 
seem that two conclusions appear clear: 
that Dalits will continue to hold politi-
cians to account, and that the path to 
caste equity lies through sustained Dalit 
mobilization and will not arrive as the 
gift of political parties.
“Go Write on the Walls That You Are the Rulers of This Nation”: Dalit Mobilization and the BJP
47
Notes
1 Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Neil De Votta for encouraging us to write this piece and 
to the anonymous referees at the journal for compelling us to strengthen and think through 
our argument. Versions and aspects of the paper were presented as an Ambedkar Lecture in 
Edinburgh and at the BASAS annual conference in 2018. We are indebted to participants for 
questions and comments on the paper. 
2 Sudha Pai, “The BJP Is Losing the Support of Dalits in the Hindi Heartland,” The Wire April 4, 
2018; Times of India, “‘Bharat Bandh’ against SC’s ruling on SC/ST Act: Top developments,” 
TimesofIndia.com April 4, 2018.
3 Eugene Irschick, A History of the New India (London: Routledge, 2015), 162.
4 Subrata Mitra, “Encapsulation Without Integration? Electoral Democracy and the Ambivalent 
Moderation of Hindu Nationalism in India,” Studies in Indian Politics 4 (1) (2016): 101.
5 BJP, “About the Party,” BJP Website 2017.
6 Savarkar cited in Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinventing India (Cambridge: Polity, 
2000), 183.
7 Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution (London: Hurst, 2003), 453.
8 Jaffrelot, Silent Revolution.
9 Jaffrelot, Silent Revolution, 456.
10 Sudha Pai, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), 
232.
11 Amrita Basu, “The Changing Fortunes of the Bharatiya Janata Party,” in Routledge Handbook 
of Indian Politics, eds. Atul Kohli and Prerna Singh (London: Routledge, 2013), 88.
12 Basu, Changing Fortunes. 
13 Jaffrelot, Silent Revolution, 105.
14 Mitra, Encapsulation.
15 Basu, Changing Fortunes, 89.
16 Radhika Ramaseshan, “RSS, BJP and Communal Polarisation in Uttar Pradesh Polls,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 51 (53), 2016.
17 Irschick, A History.
18 Ramaseshan, “RSS, BJP,” 52.
19 Mitra, Encapsulation, 93.
20 P. S. Krishnan, Former Indian Administrative Service officer in the Ministry of Welfare 
circulated a detailed analysis of the budget to the Dalit Media Watch email list on March 4, 
2017.
21 On this see: Suryakant Waghmore, Civility Against Caste (New Delhi: Sage, 2013); Hugo 
Gorringe, Panthers in Parliament (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017).
22 Cited in Jaffrelot, Silent Revolution, 105.
Indian Politics & Policy
48
23 Badri Narayan, “Dalits and the Remaking of Hindutva,” The Hindu January 25, 2016.
24 Times of India, “Upper Castes Rule Cabinet, Backwards MoS,” Times of India May 27, 2014.
25 Gilles Verniers, “Upper Hand for Upper Castes in House,” The Indian Express March 20, 2017.
26 Badri Narayan, “Memory, Identity and the Politics of Appropriation,” in Waning Hierarchies, 
Persisting Inequalities: Caste and Power in 21st Century India, eds. Surinder Jodhka and James 
Manor (Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2017), 291–311.
27 Narayan, “Memory, Identity,” 297.
28 Narayan, “Memory, Identity,” 301.
29 Karthikeyan Damodaran, Contentious Spaces: Caste, Commemorations and Production of 
Political Community in South India (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 
2018).
30 Ramachandra Guha, “Which Ambedkar?” Outlook April 21, 2016.
31 Kumar Shakti Shekhar, “Ambedkar Jayanti: How PM Modi Won Confidence of Dalits and 
Uttar Pradesh,” India Today April 14, 2017.
32 Hugo Gorringe, “The Caste of the Nation: Untouchability and Citizenship in South India,” 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 42 (1) (2008): 123–49.
33 V. N. Gadgil, “Falsifying the Truth,” Outlook July 30, 1997.
34 William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1990). 
35 See, for instance, Jagran Post, “RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat Breaks Bread with Sanitary Workers 
at Kumbh,” Jagran Post May 13, 2016.
36 Walter Andersen and Sridhar Damle, The RSS: A View to the Inside (New Delhi: Penguin, 
2018), 245.
37 Dev Ankur Wadhawan, “Caste-Based Reservation Should End at Some Point, Says RSS Leader 
Manmohan Vaidya,” India Today January 20, 2017.
38 See: http://www.bjp.org/en/core-issues/vision-of-modi accessed December 12, 2018.
39 Sheeva Dubey and Dhamma Nigam “Seven Manual Scavengers Died in Seven Days. Why Is 
There Still Silence?” The Wire January 9, 2018.
40 Ujjwala Nayudu, “Modi Likens Safai Karamcharis to Priests, Gets Back a Load of Demands 
from Angry Workers,” Indian Express January 22, 2009.
41 See here for a series of detailed articles on the issue of manual scavenging by The Wire: https://p.
thewire.in/ accessed August 16, 2018).
42 Noor Mohammad, “Modi Government Has Near ‘Zero Effect’ in Meeting Procurement Quota 
from Dalit, Adivasi Enterprises,” The Wire February 9, 2018.
43 Isabelle Guerin et al., “Insights on Demonetisation from Rural Tamil Nadu,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 52 (52): 52.
44 Dilip Mandal, “Who Is Afraid of the Writings of Babasaheb Ambedkar?” Sabarang January 16, 
2016.
45  Sumit Ganguly, “The Risks Ahead,” Journal of Democracy 25 (4) (2014): 58.
“Go Write on the Walls That You Are the Rulers of This Nation”: Dalit Mobilization and the BJP
49
46 Basu, Changing Fortunes, 86.
47 Basu, Changing Fortunes, 86.
48 BJP, “2014 Election Manifesto,” BJP.org., accessed January 16, 2018.
49 See Amrita Basu, Violent Conjunctures in Democratic India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), and Manali Desai and Indrajit Roy. “Development Discourse and Popular 
Articulations in Urban Gujarat,” Critical Asian Studies 48 (1) (2016): 1–26.
50 Pradeep Chhibber and Nirvikar Jassal, “India in 2017: The BJP, Economic Reform, and 
Contentious Politics,” Asian Survey 58 (1) (2018): 86–99.
51 Balmurli Natrajan and Suraj Jacob, “‘Provincialising’ Vegetarianism: Putting Indian Food 
Habits in Their Place,” Economic and Political Weekly 53 (9): 54–64. 
52 Natrajan and Jacob, “Provincialising,” 59.
53 Joe Arun, Constructing Dalit Identity (Jaipur: Rawat, 2007).
54 Waghmore, Civility.
55 Balmurli Natrajan, “Cultural Identity and Beef Festivals: Toward a ‘Multiculturalism Against 
Caste’,” Contemporary South Asia 26 (3) (2018).
56 Hugo Gorringe, Untouchable Citizens (New Delhi: Sage, 2005).
57 Balakrishna Ganeshan, “Are You Muslims to Eat Cow?’ Goons Attack Dalits in Telangana 
Village on Festival Eve,” The News Minute January 18, 2018.
58 The Hindu, “Dangerous Vigilantism,” The Hindu July 21, 2016.
59 India Today, “BJP MLA Supports Una Flogging, Says Filthy Dalits Were Taught Valuable 
Lesson,” India Today August 1, 2016.
60 Desai and Roy, “Development Discourse,” 7.
61 Saroj Giri, “From ‘Uprising’ to ‘Movement’ Dalit Resistance in Gujarat,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 52 (33) (2017): 16.
62  man Sethi, “Ambedkar’s Army: A Dalit Force Fights Caste Atrocities in Uttar Pradesh,” The 
Quint 2016. It is worth noting that, following his release from prison on National Security Act 
charges in 2018, Chandrasekhar Azad—leader of the Bhim Army—vowed to work toward the 
electoral defeat of the BJP; see Suryakant Waghmore, “The Competing Armies of Bhim,” India 
Today September 22, 2018. 
63 Amrit Dhillon, “How Social Media Is Empowering India’s Dalits,” The Globe and Mail July 25, 
2016.
64 Desai and Roy, “Development Discourse,” 22.
65 Shraddha Kumbhojkar “Contesting Power, Contesting Memories: The History of the Bhima 
Koregaon Memorial,” Economic and Political Weekly 47 (42) (2012): 103–7.
66 Kumbhojkar, “Contesting Power,” 106.
67 Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983).
Indian Politics & Policy
50
68 Sai Thakur and Byasa Moharana, “Bhima Koregaon and Politics of the Subaltern,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 53 (7) (2018): 12–14.
69 Anagha Ingole, “Movements as Politics: Bhima Koregaon in the Times of Hindutva,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 53 (2) (2018), 12.
70 Waghmore, “Civility.”
71 Thakur and Moharana, “Bhima Koregaon.”
72 Anand Teltumbde, “The Myth of Bhima Koregaon Reinforces the Identities It Seeks to 
Transcend,” The Wire January 2, 2018.
73 Ingole, “Movements,” 14.
74 Divya Rajagopal, “After IIT Madras Ban, Ambedkar-Periyar Study Circle Spreads to Other 
Campuses,” Economic Times June 3, 2015.
75 Sabrangindia.in, “A Letter That Should Shake Our World: Dalit Scholar Suicide Triggers 
Outrage,” Sabrangindia.in January 17, 2018. 
76 Omer Farooq, “Rohith Vemula: The Student Who Died for Dalit Rights,” BBC News January 
19, 2017. 
77 Scroll, “Prejudice Has Extracted a Terrible Price,” Scroll.in January 19, 2016.
78 Press Trust India, “JNU Students Should Take Oath to Protect Nationalism: BJP MP,” Indian 
Express July 27, 2017.
79 Jean-Thomas Martelli and Khaliq Parkar, “Diversity, Democracy, and Dissent: A Study on 
Student Politics in JNU,” Economic and Political Weekly Engage 53 (13) (2018).
80 EPW Editorial, “Life and Death of Public Universities,” Economic and Political Weekly 53 (13) 
(2018): 7.
81 Mitra, “Encapsulation,” 90.
82 I. P. Singh, “SAD-BJP Sharing Formula Covered Varsities Postings Also,” The Times of India 
January 11, 2018; Achin Vanaik, “How Does the BJP Control Educational Institutions in India? 
A Book Extract from Hindutva Rising: Secular Claims, Communal Realities,” NewsClick.in 
October 23, 2017.
83 Read the full letter here: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/dalit-
student-suicide-full-text-of-suicide-letter-hyderabad/ 
84 Anand Teltumbde, “Robbing Rohith of His Dalitness,” Economic and Political Weekly 52 
(9) (2017): 10–11. To make matters worse, while condemning Dalits as anti-nationals, new 
politically appointed University administrators quietly halted the practice of relaxing the 
marks required for Scheduled Caste students to gain University places. The upshot, as former 
IAS Officer P. S. Krishnan notes, is that “that reservation has been virtually flouted in M.Phil./
Ph.D. admissions in JNU, as seen from the following proportion of admissions: (i) SC only 1.3% 
against 15% reservation; (ii) ST only 0.6% against 7.5% reservation” (Email communication to 
Dalit Media Watch, April 4, 2018).
85 Teltumbde, “Robbing Rohith.”
86 It was left to Rohith’s friends to act in innovative ways to make their protest heard. See here 
“Go Write on the Walls That You Are the Rulers of This Nation”: Dalit Mobilization and the BJP
51
for Ph.D. recipient Sunkanna’s powerful symbolic action on the day of his graduation: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgGzwaZmCd4 
87 Anisha George, “Caste-Blind Justice,” The Indian Express April 3, 2018; Suryakant Waghmore 
and Hugo Gorringe, “By Diluting SC/ST Atrocities Act, Supreme Court undermines Dalit and 
Adivasi struggles for dignity,” Scroll.in April 2, 2018.
88 PTIa. “Govt Should File Review Petition on SC Verdict on SC/ST Act: Ram Vilas Paswan,” The 
Indian Express March 22, 2018.
89 Somya Lakhani, “Mocked for Wearing Slippers, Punished for Winning a Game: Why Thou- 
sands Marched,” The Indian Express April 3, 2018.
90 PTIb. “Supreme Court Decision on SC/ST Act ‘Appropriate’: UP Minister,” Times of India April 
2, 2018.
91 Sudheendra Kulkarni “Fair Justice,” The Indian Express April 4, 2018.
92 Kulkarni, “Fair Justice.”
93 Times of India, “Bharat Bandh”; Financial Express, “Case Against BJP Worker Raja Chauhan 
for Firing During Protest,” Financial Express April 3, 2018.
94 Lakhani, “Mocked.”
95 Sarah Hafeez, “‘Am I Not a Hindu? Don’t I Have Same Constitution?’ Asks UP Dalit Groom,” 
The Indian Express April 1, 2018.
96 Balmurli Natrajan, The Culturalization of Caste in India (London: Routledge, 2012).
97 Anupama Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India (Ranikhet: 
Permanent Black, 2009), 188.
98 Sethi, “Ambedkar’s Army.”
99 Diane Coffey et al., “Explicit Prejudice: Evidence from a New Survey,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 53 (1) (2018): 46–54.
100 Gorringe, “Panthers.”
101 Suryakant Waghmore, "From Hierarchy to Hindu Politeness?" in Waning Hierarchies, Persisting 
Inequalities: Caste and Power in 21st Century India, eds. Surinder Jodhka and James Manor 
(Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2017), 111–139.
102 Government circulars sent to media institutions in September 2018 advised against use of 
the word Dalit, again speaking to BJP attempts to accommodate Scheduled Castes only on 
their terms. For more details, see: Kasuma Satyanarayana, “Will You Tell Me Who I Am?” The 
Indian Express September 6, 2018. 
103  Mitra, “Encapsulation.”
104  Aditya Nigam, “Gujarat 2017: The Meaning of Jignesh Mevani,” The Wire December 18, 2017.
105  Gorringe, “Untouchable”; Waghmore, “Civility.”
106 David Mosse, “Caste and Development: Contemporary Perspectives on a Structure of 
Discrimination and Advantage,” World Development 110 (Oct) (2018): 422–36; also see 
Sonalde Desai and Amaresh Dubey, “Caste in 21st Century India: Competing Narratives,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 46 (11) (2011): 40–49.
Indian Politics & Policy
52
107 Ananya Vajpeyi, “The Return of Sanskrit,” World Policy Journal 33 (3) (2016): 50.
108 Mosse, “Caste and Development.”
